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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to look at the results from the mass privatisation in Bulgaria as 
one of the basic pillars of structural reform. A database from the first wave of the mass 
privatisation was used for the secondary analysis of the investment strategies of the Bulgarian 
privatisation funds.  
We grouped the 82 Privatisation Funds registered in Bulgaria in 4 groups according to 
their invested capital: Large Funds, Medium, Small and Micro Funds, and we analysed their 
investment strategies, employed during the three auctions for mass privatisation. Particular 
attention was paid on the analysis of their industrial and locational participation, along with their 
interest in firms of different size and varying control opportunities.  
A typology of privatised firms by size, main shareholders, market share and industries 
reveals a complex picture of restructuring of ownership and industrial linkages. Special attention 
is placed on the analysis of the use of specific financial instruments, such as privatisation bonds. 
Our comparrison of the mass-privatisation programmes in Poland, the Czeck Republic, Russia 
and Bulgaria reveils similarities and unique features in each country. 
 
Introduction 
 
Privatisation and de-regulation are a global phenomenon and could be defined as one of 
the fundamental features of contemporary economic policy. The trend is for the state to withdraw 
from direct management of firms and services, and to adopt primarily regulatory and control 
functions. The protective role of the state is reduced and the distribution of public goods, as well 
as the allocation of resources, is left mainly to a ‘free’ market mechanism. 
According to Welfens and Jasinski (1994), the transition from a Socialist economy to a 
Market economy in Central and Eastern Europe involves seven building blocks. These are: a) 
price liberalisation and decentralisation of the state; b) macro-economic stabilisation; c) 
privatisation; d) foreign economic liberalisation (for imports, exports and foreign direct 
investment); e) demonomolization and deregulation of stock markets and the creation of capital 
markets; f) a change of attitudes to embrace capitalist values; g) a change in the role of 
government in the policy making process. This transition policy agenda aims to transform the 
entire social system to resemble developed market economy.  
In the context of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the privatisation program was seen 
as a fundamental commitment by governments to achieve irreversibility of the changes, and to 
establish the foundations for industrial restructuring in a free market environment. This paper 
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aims to compare the frameworks for mass privatisation programs in a number of CEE countries, 
and to analyse in depth the institutional environment for mass privatisation, the introduction of 
new financial intermediaries (Privatisation Funds), and the investment strategies, adopted by the 
latter in Bulgaria.  
Our analysis of the investment strategies applied by the privatization funds in Bulgaria 
highlights the relationship between the size of the Investment Funds and their strategic choices 
during the three auctions of the mass privatisation (1997-1998). This secondary analysis of 
investment strategies applied by the Privatisation Funds in Bulgaria is based on a Council of 
Ministers database (Results from the First Wave of Mass Privatisation, 1998). 
 
Mass Privatisation Programmes in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
The diverse methods for mass privatisation of the state-owned enterprises in Eastern 
Europe have the purpose to achieve several key objectives: social justice, establishment of 
economically independent and competitive business subjects that are capable to 
mobilise and to manage effectively the available resources, and introduction and 
development of capital markets. In general, three methods of privatisation were used. 
Restitution (or the restoration of the ownership upon the appropriated in the past assets) 
was conducted in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. The implementation of this method 
is connected most of all with the achievement of social justice, and these measures do 
not lead to considerable structural changes in the economy. Cash privatisation, where 
the state offers production assets for sale to local and foreign investors, was conducted 
in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania. Apart from the 
establishment of independent economic units, and a partial restructuring of the national 
debt, the cash privatisation facilitated primarily foreign investment in firms with 
dominant market position. This form of privatisation rarely led to a large scale 
restructuring, or increased competition in the selected industrial sectors. Mass 
privatisation (or privatisation by means of investment bonds, or analogous non-interest 
state issued securities) was implemented in the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, 
Bulgaria, and many of the former Soviet republics (Simoneti, Estrin, Bohm, 1999). 
The main objectives in the use of investment privatization funds and unique quasi-money 
instruments of payment  (investment vouchers) as financial intermediaries as part of the Mass 
Privatisation were: 
• To encourage the ownership of shares among the broad layers of the population, to diversify 
the investment portfolios and to reduce the risk for small investors; 
• To stimulate the development of the financial markets through investing in securities by the 
population and through the emergence of investment intermediaries and institutional 
investors; 
• To avoid excessive fragmentation of the ownership; 
• To establish as soon as possible a new corporate management system;  
• To achieve a more effective management of the firms. 
It is clear that the mass privatisation did not aim to improve the investment climate for the 
firms, and therefore, it stimulated an opportunistic and rent-seeking behaviour among the 
investors. Among the basic reasons for using different types of securities instead of money is the 
lack of sufficient liquidity assets among the population, the demand for social justice, and others. 
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The debates on the legal framework for mass privatization were driven by the two main models: 
the Anglo-Saxon model, aiming at enhancement of the external control through trading of shares 
on the stock market, and the German model, with its emphasis on the internal control by 
shareholders and voting (Simoneti, Estrin, Bohm, 1999). The design of the IPFs as financial 
intermediaries aimed to adopt features from both models in order to establish new mechanisms 
for corporate governance in the economy. The efforts to develop new forms of corporate control 
in the economy on a massive scale, however, were not supported by sufficient emphasis on the 
regulation of the IPFs.  
The institutional structure of the privatization funds was in many respects not appropriate 
for their tasks to supervise the restructuring of the firms. The adopted form of closed-end 
diversified institutional investors gives very limited incentives to fund managers for the active 
and efficient restructuring of their portfolio, and at the same time does not provide conditions for 
strict accountability of fund’s managers.  
In most transition economies the privatisation involved the following: a transformation into a 
joint-stock company, direct sale to a predetermined buyers, restitution, distribution of vouchers 
to the public, public auction or public tender, unpaid transfer to municipal property and social 
security and health insurance, or a combination of these methods. 
The lack of active stock markets and securities markets, the lack of experience by 
shareholders and regulators, the complicated mixture of privatization methods, the delayed and 
vague legislation regulating the activities of the IPFs allowed by law multiple forms of 
opportunistic and rent-seeking behaviour by fund managers. This situation shaped very much 
their investment strategies. The positive results in Poland as exception could be explained with 
the strong supervision of fund managers by the sponsoring organizations, and with the strong 
regulation by the state. 
Our brief comparison between the Bulgarian framework, the Czech model of voucher 
privatization, The Polish and the Russian cases highlights the differences and similarities in the 
adopted approaches.  
 
The Czech Model of 'Voucher' Privatisation 
The legal framework for the Czech voucher privatization was established in 4 steps: a) Law 
on Joint Stock Companies (1990); b) Commercial Code (1991); c) Law on the Conditions of 
Transferring State Property to Other Persons (1991) and by-Law on the Issue and Use of 
Privatisation Vounchers (1991) with its amendments in 1992; d) The Regulation on Investment 
Corporations and Investment Funds (1992) – two months after the deadline for registration of 
IPFs (Kotrba, Kocenda, Hanousek, 1999).  
The voucher scheme was launched in the context of already started restitution and small scale 
privatization. Within its framework, a legal opportunity was established for all Czech citizens 
over 18 years of age to participate directly in the purchase of one or several enterprises, or to 
exchange their vouchers for shares in IPFs. During the two waves of the Voucher Privatisation, 
350 IPFs were registered. The first 13 of them took control of over 40 percent of the 
emitted vouchers (Jezhek, T., 1995).  
The Investment Funds in the Czech Republic were of closed type, with the following 
specifications: 
• they have no right to invest in more than 20% of the shares in each privatised enterprise; 
• in the event when one privatisation manager controls several Funds, the total share 
participation of these Funds into one enterprise could not exceed 40 percent; 
 4
• the Investment Funds could not perform banking activities; 
• the shares of the Investment Funds could be freely provided for sale, nevertheless their 
liquidity is quite low. 
This regulatory framework for the activities of the Investment Funds as new financial 
intermediaries makes explicit the Government efforts to establish a diverse shareholding 
structure, and to prevent direct appropriation of production assets by single private investors. The 
large number of registered Investment Funds initially was due to the very minimal required 
authorised capital. Later on, the limit was raised up ten times with the objective to prevent the 
property from partitioning 
Initially, during the first wave 1491 enterprises with total balance value of USD 10.6 billion 
were offered for privatisation. In about 400 enterprises the demand exceeded the supply. In 
general, the investors expressed interest in small and medium size enterprises - mainly in food 
and in tourism industry (Jezhek, T., 1995, Kotrba, Kocenda, Hanousek, 1999). As a result of 
aggressive advertising campaign on the side of the investment funds and the supply on the side 
of the individual investors, the Investment Funds attracted 72% of the value of the vouchers, 
possessed by citizens. 
By March 1, 1995 when the last wave of the privatisation was performed, 60% of the 
voucher points were concentrated in the Investment Funds, and about 30% in banks and in the 
Czech Insurance Company. The prevailing part of the privatisation property came into the 
ownership of Investment Funds, controlled by large state-owned banks. The state owns the 
control packages in four of the leading banks that comprise 75% of the assets of the Czech 
banking system. This 'quadro' controls also the leading Investment Funds, as well as a great deal 
of smaller banks. At the end, the state remained virtually the proprietor of the greater part of the 
Czech economy. 
In an interview for the media, Yan Mladek, director of the Czech Institute of Applied 
Economics, stated that most of the subjected to privatisation enterprises did not improve their 
status, and in some cases it got even worse ('Pari' weekly, No.41, Nov.28, 1997). According to a 
number of publications, the mass privatisation in the Czech Republic did not change 
fundamentally the structure of the economy. Results from a survey with the Czech IPFs shows 
that the main motive of the investors was ‘value maximisation through active portfolio trading 
and optimisation’ (Kotrba, Kocenda, Hanousek, 1999, p.39). The acquisition of assets therefore 
was driven by rent-seeking motives rather than to expand the economic activities of the firms. 
 
The Privatisation in Poland 
The Polish mass privatisation was oriented towards the maximisation of the economic 
efficiency and stability. Fifteen National Investment Funds (NIF) were established, with the main 
objective to assist the structural reform of the Polish economy. Each Fund was organised as a 
joint-stock company, or an Investment Fund of closed type.  
Within the established framework, each fund is controlled by a Supervisory Board, which 
represents the interests of the investors. The investors comprise of all Polish citizens over 18 
years of age that have purchased the so-called Universal Shareholder Certificates (USC). They 
are issued to a bearer and could be traded freely between the citizens or at the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange. Members of the Supervisory Board were appointed subject to their 
competency. The selection was conducted by a special state Selection Commission, and 
approved by the Prime Minister. 
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The managers of these Investment Funds have as an assignment, both to perform their 
everyday administrative functions, and to assist the enterprises in achieving access to capital 
funds new technologies and markets. The Supervisory Board signed a Contract of Management 
Agreement with the investment managers for a term of 10 years.  
On the contrary to the Czech model of free choice of participation and auction supply of 
the shares, in Poland the shares of the included into the Privatisation Program enterprises were 
distributed by the state, subject to the following scheme: 
 - 33% of the shares from each firm to be held by leading National Investment Fund; 
 - 27% of the shares to be distributed evenly between the other Investment Funds; 
 - 15% of the shares to be distributed free of charge to the workers; 
 - 25% to be retained by the state treasury (Lewandowski and Szyszko, 1999). 
The investment policy of the Funds was oriented towards the increase of the market value of 
their shares.  
As a result of the Polish program for mass privatisation three types of shares could be 
transacted at the stock exchange, and respectively to be accumulated into the investment funds. 
These are the Universal Shareholder Certificates, shares of subjected to privatisation enterprises, 
and shares of the Polish National Investment Funds.  
However, the total value of the assets of the included into the scheme enterprises did not 
exceed 5% of the total value of firm assets from the Polish industry. To accelerate, and to 
activate the process of privatisation, the Polish Selection Commission allowed foreign investors 
to the Warsaw Stock Exchange (Lewandowski, J.,  Szyszko, R. (1999). 
After the end of the first year of the mass privatisation process, the shares of the NIFs 
were allowed to be traded at the Warsaw Stock Exchange, or to be traded to strategic investors, 
and to be stored as long-term investments. This created a mixed framework of incentives – both 
for rent-seeking and for expansion of economic activities. 
 
The Russian Voucher Program 
The Russian Voucher Program is distinguished by both the excessive complexity, and the 
contradictions between objectives and results. The idea about the voucher privatisation was set in 
a Presidential Decree of 1992. Among the main objectives of the Russian program were the fast 
transformation of the public property into private one driven by the principles of social justice. 
Three years following the distribution of the first vouchers, the Russian authorities stated out, 
that 80% of the state-owned property is in private hands.  
The vouchers were distributed almost free of charge through the branches of Sbergbank (the 
Russian State Savings Bank). They could be transacted free of charge, and this was one of the 
main reasons for the rapid growth and development of a secondary market for these securities. 
Almost right away with the appearance of the first vouchers a large number of Investment Funds 
were established, proposing professional intermediary. Under the conditions of the lack of strict 
regulatory regime, a great number of Investment Funds made non-realistic promises, and 
succeeded to acquire considerable part of the vouchers of the population. 
The rights that were granted to the citizens to trade the freely acquired vouchers, 
provided an opportunity for concentration of the management of the enterprises into the hands of 
the active institutional investors, like the Investment Funds. On the other side the personnel of 
the enterprises also had the opportunity to purchase up to 51% of the shares of its enterprise, 
under preferential conditions. 
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The purchase price of the enterprises was defined by means of multiplying their book value by 
the factor of 1.7. Towards the end of the Voucher privatisation over 60% of the shares of 
privatised enterprises turned out into the hands of the workers or the management teams.  
Besides that, the investment funds were not allowed to acquire more than 10% of the 
shares in individual enterprise. In this way, they were deprived of the opportunity to appoint by 
themselves the management bodies of a particular company, and to bear the responsibilities 
respectively. The strategic investors in the Russian economy remained the former managers and 
workers’ collectives, and their main strategies remained the preservation of the firm and the 
employment status of people, and rent-seeking activities. 
 
The Mass Privatization Program in Bulgaria 
The mass privatization in Bulgaria actually starts in 1997 and is expected to end in 2001. It is 
conducted in two basic stages. The first one covers the period 1997-1998, and the second one - 
1999-2001. This paper reports data only from the first part of the Mass Privatisation Programme. 
The Program was developed with a view to accomplish the following main objectives: 
• to make a sudden change in the process of privatisation: the targets of the Program were 
mostly the large and medium-size state-owned enterprises. 
• to involve in the process of transformation of the state property the citizens of Republic of 
Bulgaria and to give them the opportunities to participate in the management of the 
transformed property; 
• to conform the long-term structural policies in the specific context of current economic 
objectives, which includes a) improvement of the state budget; b) improvement of the 
management of the state sector; c) reduced and more clear investment priorities for the state. 
The scheme anticipated part of the citizens to participate as investors in the process of 
privatization individually. However, the greater part were expected to participate through the 
established by law new type of investment intermediaries – the Privatization Funds (PF). 
 
Legal Framework for the Privatization in Bulgaria 
The legal basis of the privatization process in Bulgaria is the ‘Law for transformation and 
privatization of the state and municipal enterprises’ and the supplementary under-law acts 
(1992). It was adopted by the Parliament in 1992 and was amended several times after that. The 
Law establishes the framework for the whole privatization process in Bulgaria by settling all 
possible methods of privatization. In order to accelerate the privatization process in Bulgaria, in 
19996 the National Assembly ratified two programs – for cash privatization (SG issue 46/1996) 
and for mass privatization (SG issue 1/1996). The main methods are: Auctions; Negotiations 
with prospective buyers; Public offering of shares; Leasing agreements. The payment is made 
either in cash or as a combination of cash payment and swaps of debt-against-property.  
The leading institutions in the privatization process were the following: the Council of Ministers, 
the Privatisation Agency, the Center for Mass Privatisation, Registration Bureaus, and 
Privatisation Funds.  
The Bulgarian legislator has defined the Privatisation Fund (PF) as a special form of 
Investment Company (IC), with basic activities to acquire shares from the enterprises, included 
into the list for mass-privatisation, and to participate in the firm’s governance structure. The 
privatization funds in Bulgaria are founded under the initiatives of private legal entities (natural 
or juridical persons - as in the cases of the Czech Republic, Russia and Ukraine). This is in 
contrast with Poland and Romania, where the state plays the leading role.  
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• The Council of Ministers prepares a listing of enterprises whose privatization is prohibited, 
except for under its explicit decision. 
• The Privatization Agency, established in the fall of 1992, is responsible for the preparation of 
the annual Privatization program and for the organization and sale of the large state-owned 
enterprises to private investors. 
• The Center for Mass Privatization (CMP) is responsible for the preparation and the 
accomplishment of the mass privatization program. It is established in the summer of 1994 as 
an independent governmental organization. 
• Registration Bureaus - the accomplishment of all stages of the mass privatization is 
performed with the participation of the post offices. They issued the voucher books, 
announced the required information, submitted information to the regional centers for mass 
privatization, responded to the questions of the citizens, performed the transfers of the 
vouchers, and accumulated the bids for the auctions. More than 3000 post offices all over the 
whole country were involved in the mass privatization process 
• The Privatisation Funds could use the collected Investment Bonds to acquire shares of the 
enterprises, included into the list for mass privatisation. Within six months after the 
completion of the last centralised tender, the Privatisation Funds could terminate their 
activities as investment companies, and transformed into holding companies. 
The participation of the voucher holders in the mass privatization through the intermediation of 
PF is shown on the following Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Institutional Framework for Privatisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The investment bonds are the basic instrument used for purchase of shares of companies 
included in mass privatisation list. Subject to the Bulgarian law the investment bonds are 
specified as non par value, non-interest incurring securities with nominal value of one 
Investment Bulgarian Lev (IBGL 1). Neither of the quotations of the privatisation bonds on the 
secondary market (as far as such market is possible at all, subject to the severe restrictions, 
imposed upon the transfer of bonds), nor the inflation, or any other similar factor could have an 
impact upon the value of the IBGL. Subject to the provisions of the Privatisation Funds Act, one 
IBGL is equal to one BGL.  
The investment bonds do not hold the typical characteristics of securities. Their Emitting 
Agent is the state. Thus they are a type of state securities. The main objective of the investment 
State enterprises (offered for mass privatisation) 
Investment bonds 
Privatisation funds 
Investment bonds 
Holders of Investment bonds 
Funds 
shares 
 
Shares of privatized enterprises 
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bonds is to provide the opportunity to the citizens to receive relative reimbursement on the basis 
of the created assets by the means of their own labour. Each Bulgarian citizen with permanent 
residence in the country, who has completed 18 years of age and the children, that have one or 
both of the parents deceased, have the right to acquire Investment Bonds, and to use them to 
purchase shares directly from the companies, included into the list for mass privatisation, or to 
invest them in a Privatisation Fund in exchange for shares from the Investment Portfolio of the 
Fund. In other words the investment bonds could be considered as particular type of convertible 
obligations (convertible bonds), that could be possessed by a particular type of beneficiaries.  
The shares of the companies, which are included in the list for mass privatization, are to 
be exchanged for investment vouchers during centralized auctions. The Bulgarian citizens having 
the right to participate in the mass privatization can directly compete for the shares of the 
companies or transfer their investment voucher to privatization funds. 
The enterprises, included in the Mass Privatization Program, are selected on the 
following criteria: 
• Companies, which do not pertain to strategic economic branches and activities; 
• Companies with satisfactory financial statements for the previous year: 
• Capitalization of assets ration > 15%, 
• Net value of capital to real assets ratio > 40%, 
• Net value of capital to fixed capital ratio > 0.6; 
• Companies, which are among the biggest state-owned enterprises, with balance value of the 
long-term assets over 50 Mln BGL. (approximately USD 700 000 according to the exchange 
rate as of the date of the preparation of the list); 
• Companies, which are not monopolies in the respective branches. 
 
Table 1.: Enterprises for Mass Privatization under Ministries/ Committees 
 
Branch Ministry 
 
Number of
firms 
Total registered 
capital (Mln. leva) 
Offered equity for mass 
privatisation (mln. leva) 
Ministry of Industry 651 158,897 71,069 
Ministry of Trade and Foreign 
Economic Cooperation 
27 
 
12,730 
 
3,458 
 
Ministry of Regional Development 
and Construction   
70 
 
7,495 
 
4,515 
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 
Wine and Tobacco Industries  
167 
 
13,458 
 
7,117 
 
Ministry of Transportation 73 4,659 2,516 
Ministry of Culture 2 934 234 
Committee of Tourism  54 19,229 5,576 
Ministry of Energy 6 163 121 
Total 1,050 216,47 94,85 
 
The list of enterprises to be privatized by investment vouchers includes also those 
enterprises for which negotiations for cash privatization have been initiated. The cash investors 
have the opportunity to buy considerable shares of the larger companies after deducting the 
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portion for mass privatization, the restitution claims and the preferred stock. The investor could 
complement his property by purchasing shares of a certain company on the secondary market 
and/or by additional buy-out of the remaining state-owned stock. 
According to the above-mentioned criteria 1050 enterprises with total value of assets 
216,47 billion BGL were selected (Table 1.). The participants have the following opportunities: 
• to transfer their vouchers to a privatization fund and to become shareholders of the latter; 
• to transfer the investment vouchers to their relatives; 
• to participate directly in the centralized auctions and to purchase shares from the privatized 
companies. 
 
 The Privatisation Process 
The acquisition of shares of the privatized enterprises is performed by centralized auctions. 
Before each of them and according to a mechanism, approved by the Council of Ministers, the 
minimal price of the shares of each enterprise is determined by administrative means. For each 
auction the participants submit closed bids, which after the expiration of the stipulated period are 
opened and ranked according to the prices bidden. The offers are satisfied starting from the 
highest prices until the allocation of all shares. The participants with unsatisfied bids receive 
back their vouchers and may use them on the following auction. 
The foreign investors have the opportunity to participate in the process of mass 
privatization through privatization funds. Thirteen of the funds have foreign founders. The third 
in size fund in the country is founded by ING Bank, the latter of which operates in the country 
since 1994.  
The managers and the employees of the enterprises, subject to privatization, obtain special 
preferences, which is stipulated in the privatization laws. In the Mass Privatization Program, the 
persons, who meet this requirement may acquire for free up to 10% of the shares, offered for 
privatization, and in the cash privatization they have the right to buy (at a discount of 50%) up to 
20% of the state-owned shares. 
In the context of this broad institutional framework, one of the most interesting questions is 
the strategic behaviour of the privatisation funds in Bulgaria. Our analysis aimed to discover to 
what extend these funds acted as investment companies, and what were the main features of their 
investment portfolios.  
 
Analysis of the Investment Strategies of the Privatisation Funds in Bulgaria 
 
The enterprises offered for privatisation in the mass privatisation program are classified in 
three main groups according to the share of the equity provided for privatization: 
• stock capital for privatisation equal up to 25 % of the state interest. These are big enterprises 
important for the economy of the country and in which the state keeps the majority share, or 
is looking for to a strategic investor; 
• stock capital for privatization between 25 and 70 % of the state interest. These are large and 
middle-sized enterprises. The reserved state share is either kept for restitution claims of large 
amounts, or, as is in most of the cases, the state plans to withdraw gradually from these 
enterprises and to find investors through the cash privatization; 
• stock capital for privatization between 80 and 90% of the state interest. These are small and 
medium size enterprises, which are not provided 100% for privatisation because of 
considerations of restitution claims. 
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In practice, presently the privatisation funds restrict themselves to investments in shares of 
the privatized enterprises 95-99% of their stock. This was due to the fact that for the investments 
in Treasury Bills or bank deposits they need fresh money. So, they did not have the resources. 
What is currently allowed to the privatisation funds is investment in securities of other issuers, 
but admitted for trade at the stock market. Thus, the ability the privatisation funds have for 
diversification of their portfolios by using different instruments was highly limited.  
During the privatisation low interest was shown in the branches of the heavy industries – 
machinery construction, electronics and metallurgy. The enterprises offered from these branches 
and subject to privatization are bigger and require the investment of more vouchers. From 
another point of view, only 25% of the shares of the bigger enterprises were privatized. These 
minor stakes were not of interest, because almost all of the funds strived for acquiring larger 
stakes in order to take stronger control over enterprise. 
For our analysis we have used data and publications isued from Center for Mass 
Privatisation, Sofia (1998). We look at all 82 registered privatisation funds that took part in the 
mass privatisation program, and we analyse their investment strategies employed during the 
three waves of mass privatisation. In order to determine their strategies, we calculated the 
following indicators:  
• total value of offered shares for the mass privatisation program (in thousand leva);  
• total number of acquired shares during all three privatisation waves;  
• total number of firms in which shares have been acquired;  
• concentration of shares per firm – as an indicator 
• total number of shares in control firms (or firms where more that 50% of the firm’s shares are 
offered for sale); 
• total acquired shares in firms for asset management (where a stake of 10% has been obtained, 
as this is a significant stake, which gives an opportunity to influence company management, 
or could be sold, or exchanged in a secondary market for securities); 
• total number of shares acquired in small firms (with book value up to 200 mln leva); 
• total number of shares acquired in medium firms (with book value between 200 and 800 mln 
leva); 
• total number of shares acquired in large firms (with book value above 800 mln leva); 
• total number of shares acquired in on district; 
• total number of shares acquired in one industry. 
In addition to that, we grouped all privatisation funds into 6 groups according to their 
invested capital, or the total number of acquired shares (Table. 2). While there is an overlap 
between the number of enterprises in which funds have acquired shares in each of the six groups, 
there is a general correspondence between the size of the fund and the number of targeted firms.  
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Table 2. Typology of Privatisation Funds 
 
Groups Acquired 
Shares 
Number of 
firms 
Exceptions from the group 
trend 
Value of the targeted 
stock 
Large Funds1  1-6 million in 34-97 firms Doverie - 174 firms 
Bulgarian-Dutch Fund -111 
firms 
invested capital in firms 
worth between 40–70 
billion leva. 
Medium Funds  200-700 
thousand 
in 9-43 firms  invested capital in firms 
worth between 15-35 
billion leva 
Small Funds  100-199 
thousand 
in 6-18 firms Otechestvo – 61 firms 
Bulgarleasing- 58 firms 
South-Eastern – 30 firms 
invested capital in firms 
worth between 1-5 
billion leva 
Micro Funds  20-99 
thousand 
in 2-12 firms Rodina – 22 firms invested capital in firms 
worth between 100-970 
million leva 
 
There are also exceptions, where funds have acquired shares in much higher number of 
firms that the rest of funds in their group (see Table 1.). There is a more clear division between 
the four groups of funds in relation to the targeted stock. Large funds have targeted stock in firms 
worth between 40-70 bln leva, while the rest of the funds have acquired shares in smaller firms. 
The group of medium size funds have targeted firms worth between 15-35 billion leva. Small 
funds have targeted on average small firms worth between 1-5 billion leva and micro funds have 
targeted stock in small firms worth between 100-970 mln leva. All data calculated for acquired 
shares in firms according to size of the stock uses this typology of funds (see Table 2.). Using the 
database we looked at the types of the firms offered for mass privatisation. In our typology of 
firms offered for sale in the mass-privatisation program we identify 4 groups (Table. 3). 
 
Table 3. Typology of Privatised Firms through Mass Privatisation 
 
Type of firm Value of stock Sold Shares % of total traded shares 
Large Firms2 800mln – 18 bln leva 21,823,073 31.6% 
Medium Firms 200-800 mln leva 21,376,869 30.9% 
Small firms 50-200 mln leva 19,306,287 27.9% 
Micro firms 1-50 mln leva 6,625,609 9.6% 
Total:  69,131,838 100% 
 
After numerous interpretations of the data, we define the following expected strategies 
for testing (Table 4.). 
 
                                                 
1 This group include 3 extra-large funds (Doverie, Bulgarian-Dutch, and AKB Forest-Invest, with acquired shares 
between 4-6 mln. leva) and the group of Total Citizens -10 mln leva. 
2 This group includes two sub-groups (large firms 800 mln – 7 bln leva and 2 extra-large firms with offered stock for 
13 and 18 bln leva respectively). 
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Table 4.: Investment Strategies 
 
INDICATOR STRATEGY DESCRIPTION OF CALCULATIONS 
CONC Strategy for concentration of assets Funds that have acquired above the average for 
the total group shares / per firm 
MAN / AM Strategy for asset management  Over 80% of total acquired shares are in firms 
where more than 10% of shares are acquired by 
the fund 
CONTR / C Strategy for control Over 80% of acquired shares are in firms where 
more than 50% of shares are offered by the 
state for sale 
SMALL / SF Strategy for small firms Over 80% of acquired shares are in small firms  
MED /MF Strategy for medium size firms Over 80% of acquired shares are in medium 
firms  
LARGE / LF Strategy for large firms Over 80% of acquired shares are in large firms  
DIS / D Strategy for locational concentration in 
one district 
Over 80% of acquired shares are in firms from 
one district  
IND / I Strategy for concentration in one 
industry 
Over 80% of acquired shares are in firms from 
one industry 
 
The further analysis of the data showed that almost each of our strategies has been 
applied by some funds. There were also funds without specific strategy, and funds with multiple 
strategies (Table 4.). The strategy of  concentration of investments has been applied by 27 funds 
of large and medium size. Amongst these are the 3 extra-large funds, 1 small, and 2 micro funds. 
However the total value of shares acquired by funds applying this strategy, is 46,825,340, which 
represents  67,73% percent of the total value of acquired shares during the mass privatisation 
program. 
The next most popular strategy, applied by funds, is the strategy for asset management. It 
is used by 53 funds, and they have acquired in total 43,806,978 shares, which is 63,37% percent 
of the total value of acquired shares during the mass privatisation program. The group of funds 
that applied management strategy includes the 3 extra-large funds, 9 large funds, 19 medium, 13 
small, and 9 micro funds. This is clearly one of the most popular investment strategy, as it is 
applied by almost all of the funds with the exception of two of them (Semeen and Nikotiana) and 
the group of the Citizens. Semeen privatisation fund has opted out for a strong control strategy, 
while the Nikotiana privatisation fund has attempted to realise simultaneously strong 
concentration and industrial strategy, and a marginal strategy for large firms. 
The strong control strategy, was applied also by 53 funds. The total number of shares 
acquired with this strategy is 23,624,586, which is equivalent to 34,17% percent of the total 
value of acquired shares during the mass privatisation program. The group of funds with strong 
control strategy includes 2 extra-large, 3 large, 21 medium, 16 small, and 11 micro funds. On the 
same category, the number of funds with marginal control strategy (more that 50% of their 
portfolio is invested in shares in firms with potential control) reaches the total of 74 funds.  
Amongst the 8 exceptions of funds that have aimed at investing in firms with potential 
control are 2 large funds (Multigroup and Neftohim), 3 medium funds, 1 small and 2 micro 
funds. Overall the large and medium funds in this small group of exceptions from the trend for 
control have applied a strong concentration and asset management strategy, the medium funds 
have also applied strong to marginal industry and district strategy, while the small and the micro 
funds have opted only for a marginal industry strategy.  
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Table 5. Strategic Orientation of Privatisation Funds 
 
Privatisation fund Differences between 
total average and 
acquired shares from 
particular fund in  % 
% of shares 
for asset 
management 
% of 
Shares 
in 
Control 
Firms  
% of 
shares in 
SM 
% of 
shares in 
MF 
% of 
shares 
in LF 
% of 
shares in 
1D 
District % of 
shares 
in 1I 
Industry Strategy 
OBEDINEN BALGARSKI PRIVATISATION 
FUND DOVERIE Plc 147.08% 91.91% 82.24% 41.91% 44.23% 13.86% 17.61% Sofia obl. 16.11% Machine-building aaConc,Contr,Man, 
PRIVATISATION FUND AKB FORES - 
SOCIALEN Plc 267.27% 95.00% 85.28% 18.81% 19.27% 61.92% 47.29% Varna 46.96% Petro-chemical aaConc,Contr,Man, 
KOOPERATIVEN PRIVATISATION FUND Yug 
Plc 147.19% 88.64% 95.41% 32.75% 45.40% 21.84% 33.54% Sofia obl. 35.51% Machine-building aaConc,Contr,Man, 
NACIONALEN PRIVATISATION FUND 
SAEDINENIE Plc 103.44% 94.92% 84.41% 71.93% 28.07% 0.00% 54.21% Plovdiv 26.19% Machine-building aaConc,Contr,Man, 
PRIVATISATION FUND INDUSTRIALEN 
KAPITAL Plc 155.89% 81.73% 94.13% 37.32% 62.68% 0.00% 26.16% Haskovo 61.31% Machine-building aaConc,Contr,Man, 
PRIVATISATION FUND NASH DOM Plc 147.07% 90.96% 90.78% 56.36% 38.08% 5.56% 30.60% Varna 33.86% Food-processing aaConc,Contr,Man, 
PRIVATISATION FUND ENERGOINVEST Plc 137.77% 98.20% 100.00% 57.09% 42.91% 0.00% 33.11% Montana 42.91% Trade&services aaConc,Contr,Man, 
PRIVATISATION FUND VARNA - Plc 136.96% 84.95% 87.34% 54.45% 32.89% 12.66% 89.05% Varna 32.89% TransportShip aaConc,Contr,Man,Dis 
INDUSTRIALEN PRIVATISATION FUND Plc 126.65% 99.99% 99.99% 16.43% 83.57% 0.01% 51.91% Lovech (Pleven) 51.91% Paper aaConc,Contr,Man,Mid 
PRIVATISATION FUND MIZIA Plc 113.64% 87.86% 100.00% 33.73% 66.27% 0.00% 100.00% Russe (turgovishte) 66.27% Electrical aaConc,Contr,Man,Dis 
PRIVATISATION FUND ELEKTRONIKA 229.51% 99.91% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 99.91% Sofia 99.91% Electrical aaConc,Contr,Man,In,Dis,Mid 
                       
PRIVATISATION FUND PETROL FOND Plc 282.25% 78.90% 61.06% 21.78% 46.71% 31.51% 35.01% Sofia  32.39% Petro-chemical aConc 
OBEDINEN NACIONALEN PRIVATISATION 
FUND ZLATEN LEV Plc 176.46% 58.07% 52.66% 27.55% 38.76% 33.69% 16.25% Haskovo 29.57% Petro-chemical aConc 
PRIVATISATION FUND SEVERKOOP - 
GAMZA Plc 166.21% 70.73% 69.31% 32.45% 24.89% 42.66% 27.55% Sofia obl. 30.67% Machine-building aConc 
PRIVATISATION FUND SVETA SOFIA Plc 109.55% 54.04% 57.59% 34.18% 29.98% 35.84% 21.71% Varna 23.08% Petro-chemical aConc 
PRIVATISATION FUND OREL - INVEST Plc 146.73% 76.55% 70.05% 23.03% 61.57% 15.40% 25.16% Russe 23.63% Textile aConc 
                       
BALGARO-HOLANDSKI PRIVATISATION 
FUND Plc 194.90% 83.03% 75.84% 23.54% 32.41% 44.06% 31.77% Varna 35.04% Petro-chemical aConc,Man, 
PRIVATISATION FUND  MULTIGRUP ELIT Plc 514.83% 96.23% 17.32% 11.69% 13.04% 75.27% 39.91% Varna 49.20% Tourism aConc,Man, 
MENIJARSKO-RABOTNICHESKI 
PRIVATISATION FUND TRUD I KAPITAL Plc 187.65% 83.96% 70.43% 32.38% 46.29% 21.33% 18.39% Sofia obl. 20.41% Petro-chemical aConc,Man, 
PRIVATISATION FUND Albena invest Plc 182.05% 82.39% 53.71% 24.53% 20.34% 55.13% 38.72% Varna 39.36% Tourism aConc,Man, 
PRIVATISATION FUND NEFTOHIM - INVEST 
Plc 326.87% 99.07% 24.54% 15.47% 15.52% 69.02% 63.40% Burgas 69.02% Petro-chemical aConc,Man, 
CENTRALEN PRIVATISATION FUND Plc 188.24% 83.74% 76.89% 14.00% 38.87% 47.13% 23.92% Plovdiv 33.71% Petro-chemical aConc,Man, 
PRIVATISATION FUND KONTINENTAL Plc 163.75% 90.67% 33.13% 35.64% 2.15% 62.21% 76.06% Sofia obl. 59.02% Metalurgy&extraction aConc,Man, 
PF NIKOTIANA - BT Plc 155.01% 24.55% 1.87% 7.45% 41.78% 50.77% 44.75% Sofia 98.13% Tabacco aConc,Ind., 
PRIVATISATION FUND BALGARIA Plc 141.83% 85.63% 71.26% 29.84% 42.37% 27.79% 35.66% Varna 25.57% Machine-building aConc,Man,In,Dis,Lar 
PRIVATISATION FUND SLANCHEV BRYAG 
PRIVATINVEST Plc 117.36% 100.00% 16.13% 16.13% 0.00% 83.87% 89.33% Burgas 83.87% Tourism aConc,Man,In,Dis,Lar 
PRIVATISATION FUND IZGREV Plc 151.42% 73.48% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 73.48% Burgas 73.48% Wood-processing aConc,Mid., 
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MEL INVEST - PRIVATISATION FUND Plc 84.29% 89.94% 97.27% 66.19% 31.17% 2.65% 20.99% Lovech 49.48% Food-processing bContr,Man., 
PF RAZVITIE Plc 86.67% 92.20% 95.39% 62.70% 34.20% 3.10% 46.39% Lovech 25.84% Textile bContr,Man., 
NAPREDAK PRIVATISATION FUND Plc 98.28% 96.27% 100.00% 64.12% 35.88% 0.00% 47.79% Lovech 41.30% Machine-building bContr,Man., 
PRIVATISATION FUND BULSTRAD Plc 89.53% 80.09% 100.00% 66.11% 33.89% 0.00% 40.44% Lovech 32.24% Textile bContr,Man., 
NACIONALEN PRIVATISATION FUND TRAKIA Plc 77.56% 91.60% 100.00% 63.84% 36.16% 0.00% 73.75% Plovdiv 39.11% Machine-building bContr,Man., 
AGROINVEST NACIONALEN PRIVATIZACIONEN  
FUND Plc 62.53% 84.43% 90.87% 87.77% 3.56% 8.67% 35.45% Varna 30.44% Machine-building bContr,Man., 
PRIVATISATION FUND PATISHTA Plc 86.56% 98.87% 97.87% 75.38% 24.62% 0.00% 31.09% Lovech 42.33% Transport bContr,Man., 
PRIVATISATION FUND Marica - yug Plc 43.17% 82.74% 98.33% 39.87% 60.13% 0.00% 55.53% Lovech 63.74% Food-processing bContr,Man., 
PRIVATISATION FUND RUEN Plc 65.34% 81.53% 100.00% 84.40% 15.60% 0.00% 33.30% Sofia 47.32% Construction bContr,Man., 
PRIVATISATION FUND SIKONKO - INVEST Plc 61.07% 84.81% 100.00% 85.93% 14.07% 0.00% 49.45% Lovech 19.94% Construction bContr,Man., 
PRIVATISATION FUND REPUBLIKA Plc 76.32% 81.72% 100.00% 70.50% 29.50% 0.00% 39.50% Haskovo (StZagora) 29.50% Machine-building bContr,Man., 
PRIVATISATION FUND BALGARSKI ZHELEZNICI Plc 60.92% 93.87% 100.00% 48.83% 51.17% 0.00% 56.45% Lovech (Gabrovo) 48.64% Textile bContr,Man., 
REGIONALEN PRIVATISATION FUND SILA Plc 65.21% 81.17% 97.65% 81.17% 16.49% 2.35% 54.24% Plovdiv (Pazardzik) 48.11% Petro-chemical bContr,Man., 
            
Nacionalen PRIVATISATION FUND TRANSPORT Plc 47.37% 83.06% 96.19% 96.76% 3.24% 0.00% 45.55% Plovdiv 84.74% Transport bContr,Man.,In,Sm 
INDUSTRIALNO-AGRAREN PRIVATISATION FUND 
VI-VESTA Plc 49.82% 88.62% 99.49% 92.53% 7.47% 0.00% 27.83% Lovech 58.63% Machine-building bContr,Man.,Small, 
Severozapaden obedinen PRIVATISATION FUND 
Dunav Plc 59.40% 94.94% 88.72% 70.44% 29.56% 0.00% 100.00% Montana 47.40% Machine-building bContr,Man.,Dist., 
PRIVATISATION FUND EkoInvest Plc 49.79% 93.23% 82.55% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 83.15% Montana 40.22% Food-Processing bContr,Man.,Dist.,Small, 
PRIVATISATION FUND INDUSTRIA  Plc 81.60% 86.84% 87.98% 50.73% 49.27% 0.00% 81.49% Lovech 97.39% Machine-building bContr,Man.,Ind.,Dist., 
PF BULINVEST - GRUP Plc 57.35% 95.25% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 24.43% Russe 34.97% Construction bContr,Man.,Small, 
OBEDINEN AGRARNO-INDUSTRIALEN 
PRIVATISATION FUND ZENIT Plc 55.98% 99.01% 86.77% 99.03% 0.97% 0.00% 38.19% Haskovo 37.22% Construction bContr,Man.,Small, 
PRIVATISATION FUND KOOPERATOR Plc 41.36% 94.13% 94.67% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 35.90% Russe 31.38% Transport bContr,Man.,Small, 
PRIVATISATION FUND EKIP Plc 54.08% 84.37% 84.39% 84.37% 0.02% 15.61% 100.00% Sofia 57.74% Textile bContr,Man.,Dist., 
RUSENSKI PRIVATISATION FUND - Plc 30.75% 81.79% 98.05% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 98.79% Russe 57.30% Construction bContr,Man.,Dist.,Sm 
PRIVATISATION FUND RODINA Plc 21.92% 87.78% 96.81% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 96.73% Plovdiv 37.18% Wood-processing bContr,Man.,Dist.,Small, 
PRIVATISATION FUND MERIDIAN Plc 46.31% 84.47% 80.48% 90.65% 9.35% 0.00% 43.31% Sofia obl. 32.99% Machine-building bContr,Man.,Small, 
PRIVATISATION FUND LOZENEC - KONSULT Plc 31.19% 90.94% 98.83% 91.56% 1.39% 7.05% 53.24% Sofia 36.64% Construction bContr,Man.,Small, 
BALKANSKI PRIVATISATION FUND MIZIA - TRAKIA - 
MAKEDONIA Plc 34.21% 100.00% 90.27% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 37.42% Montana 47.53% Food-Processing bContr,Man.,Small, 
PRIVATISATION FUND MNK - invest Plc 62.01% 81.64% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 81.64% Plovdiv 81.64% Tourism bContr,Man.,In.,Dis.,Sm 
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PRIVATISATION FUND DOBRUJA Plc 74.47% 75.10% 90.93% 64.52% 34.47% 1.01% 56.21% Varna (Dobrich) 29.48% Machine-building cContr, 
PRIVATISATION FUND SEVER - Plc 66.87% 66.63% 88.23% 61.73% 20.05% 18.22% 49.82% Lovech 22.89% Machine-building cContr, 
PRIVATISATION FUND NOV VEK Plc 77.55% 62.22% 86.61% 46.68% 17.83% 35.49% 31.33% Lovech 30.32% Electrical cContr, 
PRIVATISATION FUND STROYINVEST Plc 63.73% 75.17% 93.47% 87.22% 8.53% 4.25% 38.45% Varna 28.95% Wood-processing cContr, 
FARMSTARINVEST - PRIVATISATION FUND Plc 55.52% 74.51% 85.41% 63.43% 36.57% 0.00% 79.70% Sofia obl. 20.13% Shoe&Leather cContr, 
PRIVATISATION FUND SIGURNOST Plc 60.74% 64.72% 91.17% 66.03% 0.00% 33.97% 34.56% Lovech 39.15% Electrical cContr, 
PF VAZRAZHDANE Plc 80.93% 61.40% 99.39% 72.50% 27.50% 0.00% 40.73% Sofia obl. 32.54% Machine-building cContr, 
SEMEEN PRIVATISATION FUND Plc 34.31% 31.15% 99.98% 31.65% 68.33% 0.02% 34.90% Russe (Razgrad) 34.89% Glass Industry cContr, 
Plc GARANT INVEST - PRIVATISATION FUND 43.51% 74.90% 100.00% 81.04% 18.96% 0.00% 65.24% Kjustendil 33.00% Food-Processing cContr, 
PRIVATISATION FUND IZOTSERVIZ Plc 37.68% 53.24% 87.66% 54.72% 45.28% 0.00% 61.33% Sofia 61.33% Electrical cContr, 
PRIVATISATION FUND CENTAR Plc 60.88% 69.20% 94.61% 89.65% 10.35% 0.00% 87.20% Haskovo (St.Zagora) 28.21% Textile cContr,Dist., 
YUGOIZTOCHEN PRIVATISATION FUND Plc 29.36% 63.20% 97.41% 91.73% 8.27% 0.00% 46.26% Burgas 33.03% Food-Processing cContr,Small, 
PRIVATISATION FUND BULGARLIZING Plc 11.37% 69.15% 87.73% 93.66% 4.49% 1.85% 35.93% Plovdiv 53.94% Textile cContr,Small, 
NACIONALEN FARMACEVTICHEN PRIVATISATION 
FUND  KALIMAN Plc 96.00% 66.35% 51.53% 51.78% 30.52% 17.69% 33.67% Plovdiv 85.02% Chemic&Pharmaceut Ind., 
ARMEYSKI PRIVATISATION FUND Plc 76.88% 93.91% 66.09% 39.64% 32.11% 28.25% 47.01% Haskovo 30.18% Textile Man., 
PF BULGAR CHEH INVEST Plc 64.74% 82.62% 74.14% 66.04% 33.96% 0.00% 26.03% Haskovo 37.36% Tourism Man., 
NACIONALEN PRIVATISATION FUND SVETI NIKOLA 
Plc 64.48% 85.82% 99.84% 87.41% 0.77% 11.82% 34.83% Sofia obl. 33.14% Electrical Man., 
PRIVATISATION FUND BROD - Plc 88.07% 89.95% 68.20% 72.40% 21.75% 5.86% 76.79% Burgas 21.75% Petro-chemical Man., 
PF RODNA ZEMYA Plc 43.24% 100.00% 79.87% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 65.67% Plovdiv 85.80% Textile Man.,Ind.,Small, 
                       
TOTAL CITIZENS 44.39% 39.17% 63.21% 49.58% 22.65% 27.77% 19.58% Varna 19.33% Machine-building   
PRIVATISATION FUND AKCIONER - FAVORIT Plc 69.43% 57.24% 68.16% 35.31% 40.51% 24.18% 17.70% Burgas 27.96% Machine-building   
NACIONALEN PRIVATISATION FUND NPlcEZHDA 
Plc 95.70% 65.17% 63.20% 24.46% 62.54% 12.99% 21.20% Lovech 31.38% Machine-building   
PRIVATISATION FUND KOMPAKT Plc 91.18% 58.38% 64.55% 54.99% 17.23% 27.78% 57.80% Haskovo 29.79% Metalurgy&extraction   
PRIVATISATION FUND OTECHESTVO Plc 12.86% 64.34% 65.01% 64.37% 0.02% 35.62% 32.12% Sofia 32.11% Tabacco   
PF PLEVEN Plc 53.94% 75.07% 71.40% 76.91% 23.09% 0.00% 72.24% Lovech (Pleven) 23.09% Food-Processing   
PRIVATISATION FUND - ASENOVA KREPOST, Plc 56.02% 71.06% 20.59% 20.59% 59.51% 19.90% 72.86% Plovdiv 79.41% Petro-chemical   
PRIVATISATION FUND ZPlcRUGA 21 VEK Plc 47.98% 68.33% 28.74% 68.33% 31.67% 0.00% 39.59% Burgas 50.41% Food-Processing   
TOTAL 
100.00% 
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The strong strategy for small firms has realised the acquisition of 3,531,888 shares, which is 
5,11% percent of the total value of acquired shares during the mass privatisation program. The 
group includes 6 medium, 9 small and 9 micro funds. However, another 22 funds have shown a 
marginal strategy for small firms, where  more than 50% of the investments have gone towards 
acquisition of assets in small firms. 
The strategy for medium size firms have been very marginal, and only 1 medium and 2 
small funds have adopted it. All three of them have also adopted industrial and district strategy. 
These are in the electronic industry, in paper, and in wood-processing industry. Only one 
medium size fund has adopted a strong strategy for acquiring shares in large firms. It also shows 
a strong concentration in one industry (tourism) and in one district (Burgas). 
Twelve of the privatisation funds have adopted a strong district concentration, acquired 
in total 1,903,168 shares (2,75% percent of the total value of acquired shares). Among them are 3 
medium, 4 small, and 5 micro Funds. Another 19 funds have adopted a marginal district strategy, 
where above 50% of the acquired shares are in one district. 
The strategy for industry concentration has been applied by 8 funds - 3 medium, 2 small 
and 3 micro. Within their group, they have acquired 1,593,107 shares, which is 2,30% percent of 
the total value of acquired shares during the mass privatisation program. Another 14 funds have 
adopted a marginal industry strategy where above 50% of the acquired shares are in the same 
industry. 
Overall, there are two main groups of portfolio investment strategies. One comprises of 
funds targeting shares for high concentration in firms, simultaneously with an asset management 
strategy. The other group comprises of funds targeting shares in firms, where there is a potential 
for establishment of private control, simultaneously with asset management strategy, and with 
strong small firm, district, or industry strategy. 
There is also a small group of seven funds that have only marginal strategy for assets 
management and control, and have diversified widely their risk. Among them are 1 large, 2 
medium, 3 small and 1 micro Funds, and the group of Citizens.  
A large part of the privatisation funds in Bulgaria were subsequently transformed into 
holding companies rather than to remain as investment companies. These are mostly the funds 
that specialize in certain branches and industries. There are funds among them founded by 
persons with interests and experience in different and usually non-complementary spheres - for 
example pharmaceutics, tobacco industry, electronics, grains, flour manufacturing. This 
fragmentation of the portfolio reflects the loss of economies of scale through the economy. 
The branch orientated funds which capture industrial efficiencies and the regional ones 
which capture locational efficiencies seem to strive more for control over the acquired 
enterprises and there could be expected that these funds will drain out profits at the entrance and 
the exit of the enterprises through other intermediary firms, connected to them. It is quite 
probable, that through transfer prices the profits will “flow out” into companies around the 
privatised ones. The objectives of some of the larger funds are somewhat different, namely: to 
restructure the enterprises and to increase their market value, after which the privatisation fund 
would sell the shares of this enterprise to another investor, thus realizing higher capital gains. 
The strongest interest during the auctions was shown in the food, tourism, wine and 
tobacco industries – manufacturing of cooking oil, milk production, mills, fodder plants. (Table 
6.) The second in rank are the pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and chemistry. Especially vigorous 
bidding was observed for the small and midium-sized enterprises in this branch. The enterprises 
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from the woodworking branch, furniture production, paper and cellulose production, textile, 
knitwear industry, shoes manufacturing, cement, pottery, terracotta and glass production should 
also be added to the above ranking. 
 
Table 6. Target Industry 
 
№ Target Industry % 
1. Tourism  15.2 
2. Food, wine and tobacco industries  14.4 
3. Trade and services 11.2 
4. Agricultural sector 9.7 
5. Chemical industry 6.3 
6. Oil industry 6.0 
7. Construction 5.3 
8. Military industry 4.4 
9. Telecommunications 3.4 
10. Other industries 3.7 
11. Multiple industries 19.4 
 
 
The privatization of the state-owned enterprises by investment vouchers became an 
important factor for the transformation of the state property into private one. Considerable 
legislative, methodical and informational activities were carried out by the specialized state 
bodies in order to accomplish it. About 450 thousand of the eligible persons or 15% of the 
voucher holders participated individually. These participants received investment vouchers for 
the value of about 10-11 billion BGL, which represents 16% of the whole voucher capital 
acquired. The citizens, who participated individually in the centralized auctions, had passive 
behavior. They purchased 7 465 951 shares or about 9% of the determined shares of the state-
owned enterprises (according to data from the Center for mass privatization). 
It could be concluded, that the holders of investment vouchers have trusted their holdings 
to the 81 licensed privatization funds. This is due to the comparatively well-performed 
advertising and organization work by the privatisation funds during the period for accumulation 
of investment voucher capital from the citizens. The privatization funds have attracted more than 
2,5 mil people, holders of voucher books, and have accumulated investment vouchers for more 
than 64 billion BGL, which represent 84% of the whole voucher capital of in Bulgaria. 
 
Conclusions 
 
What we have observed, is that each national government in eastern Europe while 
following the main recommendations on transition policy, has opted for specific solutions both 
as policy instruments, and as timing for their application. Restitution was conducted in four 
countries - the former Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. The auctioning of small 
companies was conducted in almost all of the central and east European countries. Spontaneous 
privatisation was a legal option only in Slovenia and Hungary. Mass privatisation, while 
conducted in almost all countries in the region, has significant differences in terms of 
instruments, allocated proportions for the state, responsible institutions and intermediaries of the 
type of privatisation investment funds. In addition, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Romania 
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have offered their utilities for sale. The significant differences in the institutional framework for 
the privatisations have lead to a variety of outcomes - legal and administrative difficulties to 
constitute a new system of property rights. 
The privatisation is a large-scale process with long-lasting economic, political and social 
consequences. The analysis of the alternative approaches, for the achievement of the general 
common objective – speed of the reform and justice in the de-appropriation - describes the 
contradictions in national regulation provisions between the objectives of the state and the 
interests of the investors. One side-effect in this process was the stimulated entrepreneurial 
activity in the economy – not only among investors, but also among other stakeholders in the 
economy, such as managers, employees, or other citizens.  
The mass privatisation program in Bulgaria facilitated the development of corporate 
governance that involved over 3 mln Bulgarian citizens with active influence on the capital 
market and the industrial sector of the economy. The privatization funds as intermediaries were 
established as the main institution. A new regulatory framework was established to regulate the 
relationships between capital markets, financial intermediaries and private investors. 
The funds should not be considered as abstract financial intermediaries, whose only 
relation to the corresponding enterprise is the purchase of shares (this is the typical role of the 
investment funds in the U.S.A.). They should be considered as strategic investors that could 
provide foreign investment and changes in technologies and market relations to the privatised 
enterprises. 
Some of the main conclusions, connected with the functioning of the privatisation and 
investment Funds, as a basic economic agents of the process of mass privatisation in Bulgaria 
are: 
(1) The listing of firms across almost all industrial sectors of the economy encouraged the 
wide diversification of investment strategies. 
(2) The regulation constraints upon the percent of the renewed shares of the subjected to 
privatisation enterprises (34% in Bulgaria, 10% in the Russian Federation etc.) lead to 
undercover agreements between the funds, or to incomplete representation of the funds into 
the management and the control bodies of the privatised companies. 
Our analysis of the investment strategies adopted by the funds shows that they depend on 
the size of the fund and the insider information. We identified a wide diversity of investment 
strategies, applied in parallel combinations. We grouped them in 7 main groups (see Table 6). 
The predominant strategies applied by the funds are the concentration strategy – attracted 68% of 
the total value of shares – and asset management strategy – attracted 63% of the total value of 
shares. This suggests a strong interest for value maximisation through portfolio management. 
The dualistic character of the investment funds – holdings and investment companies – explains 
to certain extend the preferences for risk diversification. 
The main groups describing the strategic orientation of the investment funds are the 
following (see Table 5):  
1) Funds that have applied simultaneously strong concentration, asset management and control 
strategy. This groups resembles a mixture of funds from all sizes, with preferences for small 
and medium size firms in different sectors, diversifying the risk by simultaneously seeking 
concentration of holdings in firms and preferences for firms with potential majority 
ownership. 
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2) Large funds that have applied strong concentration strategy only. This group comprises of 
large investment funds that were seeking concentration of holdings in selected large, medium 
and small firms with a particular interest in the petrochemical industry. 
3) Funds that have applied only a strong concentration and asset management strategy. These 
are funds with a particular interest in large and medium size firms in the petrochemical 
industry and tourism, seeking concentration of their holdings for future market transactions, 
or for strong participation in the governance of the firms. 
4) Funds that have applied only strong control and asset management strategy. In this group 
funds have opted for investment in selected small firms with moderate district and industry 
focus. 
5) Funds that have applied a mixed strategy excluding concentration of holding. These are 
primarily small and medium size funds that have made very precise choices regarding their 
portfolio and acquiring significant holdings primarily in small and medium firms with 
potential control.  
6) Funds that have applied either strong control, or strong asset management strategy focused 
on selected firms. This group differs from group 5 by their strong orientation for holdings in 
small firms. 
7) Funds that are not associated with any particular strong strategic orientation. A small group 
of funds, including the group of individual citizens, have exhibited no strong orientation in 
their investment strategy, spreading their holdings between firms of different size, and in 
different industries and districts. 
The very little emphasis that funds put on potential industrial and district dominance 
suggests that fund managers were not interested in direct management of the assets, and the 
benefits of locational and industrial efficiencies.  
Ultimately the Bulgarian Mass Privatisation Program produced a large volume of single 
private firms owned simultaneously by different investment funds. The evolving governance 
structure and broken supplier linkages of these firms reduced their abilities to absorb market 
pressure. The transfer of property rights therefore was achieved at the expense of reduced 
flexibility of firms to respond to market signals. Our results highlight once again the mixed 
outcomes from the privatisation that took place in central and eastern Europe. 
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